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**Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee** 

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Director of Central Intelligence	<del>- Secret</del>	25X′

Brazil and High Technology:
A Source for the Soviet Bloc

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TTIC 87-10004
June 1987

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## Note to Readers

The Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC) is the DCI Committee whose mission is to serve as the focal point within the Intelligence Community on all technology transfer issues. The Committee coordinates Community activities and is the principal source of intelligence support for those US Government entities charged with the responsibility for policy and action on technology transfer issues. It works with other Intelligence Community committees and appropriate agencies to ensure that intelligence information collected on technology transfer is consistent with the DCI's priorities and guidance and meets the needs of Community production organizations.

## The TTIC Chairman and members are:

	Central Intelligence Agency	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Central Intelligence Agency	
	Defense Intelligence Agency	
Mr. Vincent DeCain	Department of Commerce	
Mr. David Whitman	Department of Defense	:
Dr. Robert Bingham	Department of Energy	;
Mr. A. R. Cinquegrana	Department of Justice	
Mr. Rodney Huff	Department of State	
Maj. Mario Avalos	Department of the Air Force	į
Lt. Col. J. Rob Robinson	Department of the Army	•
Mr. Russ Vaughn	Department of the Navy	
Mr. Arthur Long	Department of the Treasury	i
Mr. William Meglen	US Customs Service	,
Mr. Roger Diehl	Federal Bureau of Investigation	
	National Security Agency	25X1
Ms. Kristine Langdon	National Security Council	
Lt. Col. Robert Davie	Office of the Secretary of the	
	Air Force	?
	Technology Transfer Intelligence	25X1
	Committee	i i
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## **Preface**

This report assesses the role of Brazil as a target for Soviet Bloc acquisition of controlled commodities and technology. It examines several indigenous high-technology industries, including telecommunications, computers, strategic minerals, robotics, and weapons, that the USSR and its allies could acquire. The report also discusses Brazil's firm stance on economic sovereignty and its effect upon Brazil's attitude toward export control practices and technology transfer safeguards.

The report was prepared for the State-chaired Senior Interagency Group on the Transfer of Strategic Technology. Information as of 24 April 1987 was used in preparing this report. Members of the Working Group were:

Ma Dishard Provi	Central Intelligence Agency	25X1
Mr. Richard Bray	Air Force/Foreign Technology Division Defense Intelligence Agency	25 <b>X</b> 1
	Defense Intelligence Agency	23/(1
	Central Intelligence Agency	
	Central Intelligence Agency/TTIC	
	National Security Agency	
Ms. Lisa Hilliard	Department of Commerce	
	Central Intelligence Agency	25X1
Ms. Margaret Shields	Department of Commerce	
Ms. Paula Todrin	United States Customs Service	
	Central Intelligence Agency	25 <b>X</b> 1

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	Brazil and High Technology: A Source for the Soviet Bloc	25
Summary and Conclusions	Brazil currently is a potential source of certain milit ogies for the Soviet Bloc. In the past two decades, B markable economic growth and achieved impressive technological development. We believe, however, the upgrade its indigenous capabilities and improves its a technology, it will present an even more attractive to acquisition efforts.	razil has registered regains in scientific and at Brazil continues to access to Western high
	Impressive advances have been made in areas where adequate resources. We believe that the telecommunication scientists collaborate closely with Western provide the USSR with the best opportunities for actechnology equipment and data. Brazilian capabilitition and processing—a metal vital to the development tors—is also an area the USSR can exploit.	nications sector, where researchers, will quiring high-es in niobium produc-
	Brazil's information technology industry is a less att Soviet Bloc; its low quality and high cost in relation world market make sizable exports to the USSR uncomputer companies' lack of capital, management e infrastructure, coupled with highly protectionist polithe development of an innovative informatics industrier, the ties that some Brazilian computer companies make small-scale diversions of COCOM-controlled	to other sources in the likely. Brazilian xpertise, and research cies, militate against ry. We believe, howevhave to Western firms
	Because of its growing capability, emphasis on upgraindustry, and a commitment to expanding a scientific Brazil could be a viable source of additional sensitive coming years. Computer-assisted design systems now and advanced semiconductor research may be future present, the capabilities of Brazil's arms industry are Soviet attention, but Brasilia's determination to incontechnology into arms for export will present a threat safeguard sophisticated technology. Finally, the growians studying scientific and technical subjects at We presents a potential source of technical data transfer	c manpower base, e technologies in the w under development e Soviet targets. At e too low to attract orporate Western to COCOM efforts to wing number of Brazil- stern universities
	<sup>1</sup> Members of the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Expinclude Japan and all NATO countries except Iceland.	

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Nevertheless, Brazil probably will not grant the extent of protection that the United States requires and over time may skirt the restrictions. At best, Brasilia will look upon controls as a burdensome, but necessary, expense of obtaining the technology it wants and probably will be lax in enforcing Memorandum of Understanding provisions. Moreover, Brazilian firms may reverse engineer key high-technology components and then seek export rights for "Brazilian" versions of such products—posing political problems for Washington and its COCOM allies over enforcement mechanisms

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